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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
RECOVERY OF FUNERAL EXPENSES IN A
SURVIVAL ACTION
The plaintiff, administratrix of the decedent's estate, brought suit
pursuant to Florida Statute section 45.111 for injuries to the decedent
which resulted in his death.2 The trial court instructed the jury that in
awarding damages they might take into account the funeral expenses of
the decedent. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the instruc-
tion.8 On appeal, held, affirmed: A personal representative may recover
for funeral expenses in a survival action brought under Florida Statute
section 45.11. The power to recover is inherent in an administrator since
he is legally bound to pay funeral expenses out of estate funds. Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. Butler, 190 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1966).
At common law a cause of action in tort abated upon the death of
either party thereby precluding any recovery.4 The origin of this rule is
obscure,5 but the maxim was actio personalis moritur cum persona, a
personal right of action dies with the person.6 One of the more reason-
able theories advanced for the rule was that, since damages at common
law for bodily harm were punitive in nature, where the wrongful act
amounted to a felony, the civil wrong was merged with the crime and
the Crown exacted the penalty from the wrongdoer. 7
In addition to the abatement of the cause of action, survivors of
the decedent were also barred from recovering for their own losses as a
result of the decedent's death. This result is usually attributed to the state-
ment by Lord Ellenborough that "the death of a human being could not
be complained of as an injury."8
1. No action for personal injuries and no other action shall die with the person,
and all actions shall survive and may be instituted, maintained, prosecuted and
defended in the name of the personal representative of the deceased, or in the name
of such other person as may be provided by law.
FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1965).
2. The facts of this case are set forth in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Butler, 172 So.2d 499
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
3. Ibid. This put the Third District Court of Appeal in conflict with the Second District
Court of Appeal which had held that funeral expenses were not rcoverable in a survival
action. See Doby v. Griffin, 171 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). 'Ihis conflict was the basis
of the supreme court's jurisdiction in the instant case.
4. See generally PROSSER, TORTS 920-37 (3d ed. 1964); Alpert, The Florida Death Acts,
10 U. FLA. L. REV. 153-56 (1957); Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death,
33 MicH. L. REV. 545-51 (1935); Smedley, Wrongful Death Actions in Tennessee, 27 TENN.
L. REV. 447-48 (1960); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13
VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960).
5. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 920.
6. Ibid.; Smedley, supra note 4, at 606-09.
7. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 920; Alpert, supra note 4, at 153; Smedley, supra
note 4, at 607-08.
8. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). See Alpert, supra note 4,
at 154.
It is interesting to note that no authority was cited in support of the statement nor any
reason given, and the husband of the deceased woman was permitted a recovery of £100
from the tortfeasor to compensate him for the loss of her services from the time of her
injury until the time of her death. Baker v. Bolton, supra. Prosser, in discussing this case,
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These rules have been changed by statute in every jurisdiction.'
Unfortunately, most of these statutes have failed to draw a clear di-
chotomy between the two separate causes of action sought to be preserved
and, as a result, the area of wrongful death acts and survival statutes has
been clouded.' °
While a survival statute should preserve a cause of action for all
damages which the decedent could have recovered had he lived, a
wrongful death act gives a new cause of action to the decedent's bene-
ficiaries for the loss they have sustained by reason of the wrongful death
of their provider."
Notwithstanding the type of statute or statutes within a given juris-
diction,'2 the majority have allowed recovery of funeral expenses under
their various wrongful death acts.' However, the question presented in
the instant case, who may recover, would be of little importance in most
jurisdictions since only one recovery is generally permitted. But, where,
as in Florida, a jurisdiction has maintained the true dichotomy of the
two statutes and two actions may be maintained, 4 the question of
whether recovery should be had under the survival act, thereby desig-
nating funeral expenses as a loss to the decedent, or whether the named
beneficiaries should recover under the wrongful death act arises.
speaks of "Lord Ellenborough, whose forte was never common sense .... " PROSSER, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 924.
9. See Alpert, supra note 4; Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action
jor Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TinL. L. REv. 386-87 (1942); Comment,
44 HARV. L. REV. 980 (1931).
The majority of the legislation is modeled after the English Fatal Accidents Act, more
commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93. The various statutes
are enumerated and classified in Oppenheim, supra at 386-419; Rose, supra note 4, at 587-96;
Comment, 44 HARV. L. REV. 980 (1931).
10. "There is probably no field of tort law in which confusion is more apparent than
[that of] wrongful death and survival of tort actions." Oppenheim, supra note 9, at 386.
"[T]he general failure . . . to segregate the various interests involved has precluded any
just or consistent body of law in this field." Id. at 387, citing Note, 35 IiL. L. Rav. 479,
480 (1940).
"The result [of these acts] has been confusion compounded across the several states of
the United States . . . . " Alpert, supra note 4, at 156.
11. Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213 (1945), modified on rehearing, 156
Fla. 745, 25 So.2d 218 (1946).
When physical injury has been done a person by the tortious acts of another per-
son and the injury ultimately causes death two rights have been violated. One is
the common-law right of the injured person to be secure in his person and his
property-a right which has been invaded by compelling such a person to endure
pain and suffering and to submit to loss of earnings and other pecuniary losses. The
other right violated is the right which the family of the deceased had to the com-
panionship, services or support of the decedent, coupled with the expectancy of a
participation in the estate which such person might have accumulated had his life
not been brought to an untimely end by the infliction of the injury. Two separate
and distinct rights or interests have thus been infringed upon . ...
Id. at 750, 25 So.2d at 220. (Emphasis added.) Accord, PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at
928-29.
12. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
13. Oppenheim, supra note 9, at 392.
14. Ake v. Birnbaum, supra note 11.
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At this point it might be profitable to pause and ask, should funeral
expenses be recoverable at all? One jurisdiction, Iowa, has answered in
the negative.15
The logic of the Iowa courts would seem irrefutable. Are the fu-
neral expenses an item of damage which would not have occurred but for
the wrongful act of the tortfeasor? Every man must eventually die, and
it is a valid assumption that he will be buried and that his estate will
incur the expense. 6 The real damage which is occasioned is that the
estate will have to make these expenditures now, compelling an expense
which might not have been incurred for years to come.' Therefore, com-
pensation is allowed, in the form of interest, for the loss of the use of the
money from the time of the tortious death until the probable time of
natural death,' 8 but not to exceed the amount of the funeral expense.' 9
This is the only jurisdiction which takes this position."
A recent case in a jurisdiction which distinguishes the two actions,
has stated that:
The simplest logic dictates that there can be no recovery for
funeral expenses in an action under the survival statute because
one cannot sue and recover for his own funeral expenses.2
This case adds, however, that funeral expenses would be recoverable,
if paid, as an item of damage in a wrongful death action.22 The legal
obligation of the party who has paid is often given as the reason for
permitting recovery in the wrongful death action.23
Other jurisdictions have permitted recovery in a wrongful death
action, while denying it in a survival action, because funeral expenses
15. Brady v. Haw, 187 Iowa 501, 174 N.W. 331 (1919). This is the original decision.
Accord, Hurtig v. Bjork, 138 N.W.2d 62 (Iowa 1965).
16. Brady v. Haw, supra note 15, at 504, 174 N.W. at 332.
[I]t is in the law of nature that all must die, and we assume that, in all Christian
countries the dead receive decent burial ...with some expense to the estate.
17. Id. at 505, 174 N.W. at 332.
18. Ibid.
19. Hurtig v. Bjork, supra note 15, at 63.
20. In two other jurisdictions, funeral expenses, along with all the other usual elements
of damage occurring in a wrongful death are not considered because the statutes are puni-
tive. It is the culpability of the defendant's acts which is considered in awarding damages.
See Board of Trustees v. Harrell, 188 So.2d 555 (Ala. 1965) ; O'Conner v. Benson Coal Co.,
301 Mass. 145, 16 N.E.2d 636 (1938).
21. Gowan v. Thomas, 237 S.C. 223, 225, 116 S.E.2d 761 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
Noted, 14 S.C.L.Q. 147 (1961). The court added that "the situation is reminiscent of the
old gag, 'Can a man legally marry his widow's sister?'" Id. at 225, 116 S.E.2d at 761.
22. Ibid.
23. Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So.2d 776, 778 (Fla. 1954); Potts v. Mulligan, 141 Fla.
685, 690-91, 193 So. 767, 769-70 (1940). This has sometimes had the effect of precluding a
wife's recovery where she has no duty to bury her husband. Id. at 690, 193 So. at 769; cf.
Caen v. Feld, 371 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. 1963) (beneficiary under wrongful death act permitted
recovery even though she had no legal duty to pay for funeral because she paid to prevent
her father's burial at public expense or the possibility of his body being donated to a
medical institution as provided by state statute).
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accrue "from and after the death, while the cutoff point under the sur-
vival statute is the death itself." 4
In some instances, where funeral expenses were sought to be re-
covered, no distinction was made between the two statutes and recovery
was allowed under either.25 A widow was permitted to recover funeral
expenses she had paid for her husband on the theory that she could have
demanded reimbursement of these expenses from the estate and the estate,
in turn, would have been able to recover them from the tortfeasor, al-
though no authority was given for the latter proposition.26 Of course,
once the widow recovered, the administrator could no longer claim the
funeral expenses in a separate suit. A Texas court has stated that where
the statutory beneficiaries under the wrongful death act have paid the
funeral expenses, or are liable for them, then these expenses are a proper
element of damage under the wrongful death act.27 However, because
the expense of a funeral constitutes a charge against the decedent's estate
and "is part of the expense which must be incurred as a result of the
injuries," an administrator would also be qualified to recover the cost
of the funeral in a survival action, provided, of course, that there was no
double recovery. 8
Other jurisdictions, while refusing to permit recovery under the
survival statute, have permitted recovery in a separate suit brought by
an administrator or a party legally obligated to pay for the funeral. 9
This is a separate cause of action from one brought under a survival
statute. The courts have held, under this theory, that the defendant's
acts amount to a tort against the administrator or obligor since they must
pay for the funeral because of his wrongful act.3°
24. Mathies v. Kittrell, 354 P.2d 413 (Okla. 1960).
Since the damages recoverable in a survivor action are limited to the damages
which accrued to the deceased . . .up to the time of . . . death, it follows that
funeral expenses cannot be recovered in a survivor action. Funeral expenses accrue
from and after the death and are properly a part of the damages to be recovered
in a wrongful death action.
Id. at 415.
25. Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A.2d 760 (Del. 1965); Landers v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 369
S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1963); cf. Schwab v. Nelson, 249 Wis. 563, 25 N.W.2d 445 (1946).
26. Reynolds v. Willis, supra note 25.
27. Smith v. Farrington, 117 Tex. 459, 463, 6 S.W.2d 736, 738 (1928).
28. Landers v. B. F. Goodrich Co., supra note 25, at 35; cf. Schwab v. Nelson, supra
note 25. The court said that where there is an estate and a cause of action survives under
the survival statute, then the estate, being primarily liable for funeral expenses, is the proper
party to recover. When there is no estate (for instance, a child) then the wrongful death
act, by implication, creates a liability in the statutory beneficiaries since they have the bene-
fit of a right of recovery because of the decedent's death, and thus, they have a right to
recover these expenses from the tortfeasor in the wrongful death action. This somewhat un-
usual reasoning has since been adopted by the legislature. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.04(5)
(Supp. 1966).
29. Graul v. Adrian, 32 ll. App. 2d 345, 347-48, 205 N.E.2d 444, 446 (1965) ; Eggimann
v. Wise, 56 Ill. App. 2d 385, 392-93, 206 N.E.2d 472, 476 (1964); Moss v. Hirzel Canning
Co., 100 Ohio App. 509, 511, 137 N.E.2d 440, 442 (1955).
30. Moss v. Hirzel Canning Co., supra note 29, at 511, 137 N.E.2d at 442:
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Prior to the decision in the instant case, the rule in Florida was that
only the husband could recover funeral expenses since he was under a
duty to pay them. 1 The recovery was permitted in suits brought under
the wrongful death act32 if pleaded as special damages.8"
In Doby v. Griffin 4 a Florida court considered for the first time
whether funeral expenses could be recovered under the survival statute.
Taking the strict construction of the survival act,85 that the only dam-
ages recoverable were those which the decedent could have recovered
had he lived,3" and that, therefore, death was the cutoff point in consid-
ering damages, the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that fu-
neral expenses were not an element of damage in a survival action.
In the instant case, the supreme court considered the strict construc-
tion of the statute 7 but said:
Common logic dictates that a tortfeasor should be held answer-
able to someone for the funeral expense of the person fatally in-
jured by his tortious act ....
The court noted, however, that while a husband was permitted re-
covery in a wrongful death action, the wife was not.39 But, since the
administrator was bound to pay funeral expenses out of the estate, then
he should recover in the name of the estate.4"
The basic premise that funeral expenses are recoverable at all is a
difficult one to support; the logic of the Iowa courts, mentioned previ-
ously, would seem to be unassailable.
It is this writer's opinion that Florida is one of the few states which,
legislatively and judicially, has shown a true understanding of the sur-
vival statute, the wrongful death act, and the differences between them.
What the court, in effect, has said in Sinclair is, "If funeral expenses are
an item of damage which result from a wrongful death, then let them be
recoverable without discrimination." This has been accomplished.
STEVEN J. ROSE
Plaintiff's right of action for funeral expenses is one not existing by virtue of the
survival statute. It is a direct action under the common law, and it arises by reason
of . . . the duty to provide for . . . [the wife's] . . . funeral services and a decent
burial.
31. Lithgow v. Hamilton, supra note 23, at 778; Potts v. Mulligan, supra note 23, at
690-91, 193 So. at 769-70.
32. Ibid.; see FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01-.02 (1965).
33. Lithgow v. Hamilton, supra note 23, at 778.
34. 171 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
35. Ake v. Birnbaum, supra note 11.
36. Doby v. Griffin, supra note 34, at 406-07; accord, Spillman v. Weimaster, 275 Mich.
93, 99, 265 N.W. 787, 790 (1936); Radobersky v. Imperial Volunteer Fire Dept., 368 Pa.
235, 243, 81 A.2d 865, 869 (1951).
37. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Butler, 190 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1966).
38. Id. at 316.
39. Ibid.; see Potts v. Mulligan, supra note 23, at 690, 193 So. at 769.
40. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Butler, supra note 39, at 317, 319.
